Slack and sleeping senses must be addressed with thunder and heavenly fireworks.

 --Thus spoke Zarathustra

**It’s try or die. Atterton 94:**

(Peter, Phil UCSD, History of the Human Sciences Journal, v. 7)

**Indeed, it is a sobering thought that Homo sapiens is one of the most recent species on the planet** (an infant 40,000 years old) **and**, as far as we can tell, **looks like being one of the most short-lived. It is a sanguine thought of Foucault’s**, on the other hand, **that ‘Western man [or woman]’ in the milieu of bio-power, consumed by the will to know** both himself and every other, **is an even later arrival on this earth, and is perhaps nearing his [or her] end ‘like a face drawn in the sand at the edge of the sea’** (Foucault, 1970: 387). **It is impossible to say how long the ebb and flow of the tide will take for another face** (palimpsest or new) **to reveal itself—nor is one sure whether the rest of the earth** and humanity **will be able to survive the wait. Perhaps Nietzsche was right in The Dawn to taunt us with the prospect of extinction in the enigmatic way that he did: ‘which do we prefer? That is the question. Do we want man [or woman] to end in fire and light or to end on the sands?’** (Nietzsche, 1964: 257). **As long as we have lost faith in the creature whom ‘we’ are**, as long as we do not feel at home in society and are short of breath, **then a new dawn would appear to be drawing closer, and** this **without pyrotechnics, as when the first fish crawled out of the sea.**

Traditional modes of political recourse fail. Kulynych 97:

(Jessica, Pol Sci Winthrop U, “Performing politics: Foucault, Habermas, and postmodern participation,” Polity, vol. 30, no. 2, Winter, p. 315)

Political scientists have traditionally understood political participation as an activity that assures individual influence over the political system, protection of private interests, system legitimacy, and perhaps even self-development. **Habermas and Foucault describe** the impact of the conditions of postmodernity on **the possibility for efficacious political action in remarkably similar ways. Habermas describes a world where the possibilities for efficacious political action are quite limited. The escalating interdependence of state and economy, the expansive increase in bureaucratization, the increasingly technical nature of political decision-making, and the subsequent colonization of a formerly sacred private sphere by a ubiquitous administrative state render traditional modes of political participation unable to provide influence, privacy, legitimacy, and self-development.** As the state is forced to take an ever larger role in directing a complex global, capitalist, welfare state economy, the scope of administration inevitably grows. In order to fulfill its function as the manager of the economy, the administrative state must also manage the details of our lives formerly considered private. Yet, as the state's role in our "private" lives continues to grow, the public has become less and less interested in government, focusing instead on personal and social mores, leisure, and consumption. Ironically, we have become less interested in politics at precisely the same moment when our lives are becoming increasingly "politicized" and administered. This siege of private life and the complicity of this ideology of "civil privatism" in the functioning of the modern administrative state makes a mockery of the idea that there exist private interests that can be protected from state intervention. Correlatively, the technical and instrumental rationality of modern policymaking significantly lessens the possibility for public influence on state policy. **The difficulty of participation in Habermas's world is exacerbated by the added complexity of a political system structured by hierarchical gender and racial norms.** Nancy Fraser uses Habermas's analysis of the contemporary situation to demonstrate how the infusion of these hierarchical gender and racial norms into the functioning of the state and economy ensures that political channels of communication between citizens and the state are unequally structured and therefore cannot function as mechanisms for the equal protection of interests. **Accordingly, theorists are much less optimistic about the possibilities for citizens to acquire** or develop **feelings of autonomy and efficacy from the attempt to communicate interests to a system that is essentially impervious to citizen interests, eschews discussion of long-term goals, and requires exclusively technical and instrumental debate. Similarly, Foucault's complex genealogical descriptions of disciplinary power networks challenge the traditional assumption that political power is located primarily in the formal apparatus of the state. The traditional understanding of political participation tells us nothing about what types of political action are appropriate in a world where power is typically and predominantly disciplinary, productive, and normalizing.** As long as we define the purpose of participation only in terms of influence, privacy, legitimacy, and self-development, we will be unable to see how political action can be effective in the contemporary world.

**The study of nonsovereign operations of power allows us to examine our subjectivity and access our micropolitical world. May 93:**

(Todd, Between genealogy and epistemology, p. 111-112)

Genealogy is the micro political science. If the functioning of power over the past several centuries is no longer exhausted in the exercise of sovereign or sovereign-style repression, **if in order to understand contemporary domination we must look not only toward the state but toward the small practices of knowledge and of discipline, then genealogy is the study of nonsovereign operations of power** in the present age. **Such a study is necessarily micropolitical. It concentrates not upon the obvious power wielded by recognizable institutions and classes in clearly cynical ways, but upon the effects of practices of detail, practices with no ostensible interest in power but whose products comprise an array of power relationships.** Those small, and at times overlapping, practices—practices of medicine, penology, and psychology among them—create new fields of power by constraining action, by joining power to forms of knowledge, by seeping into the social fabric and tracing lines of obedience. Power is no longer articulated solely along the axis of sovereignty, but also along the axes of normalization and subtle constraint. Thus, there are “these two limits, a right of sovereignty and a mechanism of discipline, which define, I believe, the arena in which power are exercised” (Foucault 1980a, p. 106). It is within the domain of discipline, among its discourses and its practices, that genealogy finds its objects. What genealogy attempts to do is to realign our political thought, so that it will catch up with our political reality. **We live in a world governed by powers which are micropolitical, which do not so much repress our inherent desires as create them**, be it through public media, education, psychological, discourse, or other forms of interaction. **To continue to see ourselves in traditional political terms is to refuse to recognize the changes that have infused our political world. Moreover, such a refusal permits those changes to operate without restraint, since it is only when we begin to see what is happening to us—and what is happening to constitute us—that we may ask the question of which among these changes we shall endorse and which we shall reject. Genealogy, as we have we interpreted it here**, is the epistemic tool that **allows us access to our micropolitical world.**

**OUR ADVOCACY: We affirm this year’s resolution as a metaphor which radically calls into question the nonsovereign operations of power often known as the CEDA-NDT caselist and its indefinite detention of the 1AC.**

**Nietzsche 1873:**

(Friedrich, “On Truth and Lie in an Extra-Moral Sense,” Portable Nietzsche, p. 46-47)

**What, then, is truth? A mobile army of metaphors, metonyms, and anthropomorphisms—in short, a sum of human relations which have been enhanced, transposed, and embellished poetically and rhetorically, and which after long use seem firm, canonical, and obligatory to a people: truths are illusions about which one has forgotten that this is what they are; metaphors which are worn out and without sensuous power; coins which have lost their pictures and now matter only as metal, no longer as coins.**

**THE CASE AGAINST THE CASELIST**

**First, the caselist is an operation of textuality which follows the modern predilection of evacuating the body from communication while also serving as the primary force behind the unequal valuation and management of bodies.**

**Federman & Holmes 11:**

(Cary & Dave, “Guantanamo bodies: Law, media, and biopower,” Media Tropes ejournal)

**The emergency created by the war on terror presents** itself as the central meaning of the war because it turns a common administrative problem of war into **the prime ethical problem that plagues modern thought: the management of bodies according to the valuation of their worth.** It is in this sense that **Guantánamo has reframed the identity and the status of the prisoners held there, legally and ontologically, by removing any stake they might once have had in a “qualified life”** (Agamben, 1998, 1), that is, in a life beyond mere existence. Guantánamo has reduced its inmates to life as such, **forcing** these **bodies to exist at a point of convergence among biopolitical, bioethical, and biocultural realms.  Guantánamo is** more than a prison; it is **a “norm-producing” entity** (Johns, 2005, 615). **The prison camps in Cuba have helped frame the understanding of the war on terror as premised on biological-political rationalities. The ground of that reality is the value of life itself, measured by the body of the prisoner.**

**Marvin 06:**

(Carolyn, “Communication as embodiment,” in Shepherd, G. J., St. John, J. & Striphas, T, Communication as…: Perspectives on theory, p. 69-70)

It remains hard to stake out a bodily focus for communication in a field that has its center in text-focused media regimes. Our first task is to reconsider mediation itself. Instead of implying a historical progression of textual artifacts on a one-way mission to leave the body behind, mediation is more accurately characterized as *any* packaging of the communicative body expressed in one of two modes. *Dramatization* works to enhance the potency of the communicative body. Clothes, ornamentation, masks, perfume, cosmetics, armor, dancing, singing, feasting, and oratory are dramatizing media that take the communicative power of the physical body seriously and amplify its aura, the sense of its communicative presence.

***Textualization* works by evacuating the body from communication and impoverishing** this aura **[the sense of its communicative presence]. It does not get rid of bodies** (though this happens—as Henri Lefebrve says [1991], the text kills) **so much as it covers up and disguises them, or attempts to turn them into texts.** Print, musical notation, film, telephony, and video are **textualizing media** that **fragment and reconstitute the body’s message in simplified form. Sociologically, textualization gives rise to two great classes.** One of these commands text; the other is commanded by it.

**The textual class** (it includes, no surprise, academics) **is skilled at producing and using texts. It is also the class most entitled to shield and preserve the bodies of its members from physical hardship and danger. This is its privilege, to withdraw the physical body from the fray while deploying those for whom withdrawal is not an option. The body is the emblem of those who lack textual credentials, whose bodies are available to be used up by society, and whose powers of social participation derive from whatever value their bodies have for cultural muscle work, the most dramatic expression of which is war. In modernity, all bodies are disciplined by texts**: some to use them, some to stay away from them (Marvin, 1994, 1995). **Textualization is the indispensable act of modern power in which every aspect of our lives is implicated.** It confers personhood and social status through textual identification and credentialing. It saturates the imaginative environment with information, advertising, and entertainment, all of which overwhelm the authority of bodily experience.

**To portray the textual class as the seat of modern power may seem ludicrous to academics who find it difficult to imagine themselves in any such position. They are, of course, only handmaidens. In the social ecology of text-body relations, academics are textual functionaries who recruit and train new text-class members while convincing the body class to hold textual institutions in awe.**

**What does it mean, then for the textual class to rule? Consider how U.S. presidents**, who dress in the uniform of textual professionals and rarely display emblems of combat familiar to traditional societies, **wage war. A president goes to war not by raising his [or her] sword, but by signing a text. No guns move without signed orders, though the president’s power lies in the readiness of these guns to respond and in the belief of those who stand behind them in the Constitutional text that authorizes the governmental system.** Much cultural energy is devoted to concealing this absolute reliance of the textual class on its bodily substratum and to eliminating opportunities for it to move against the textual class. This antagonism toward the body class it depends on is the deep contradiction at the heart of textual sensibility and power.

**Second, the caselist is an operation of sovereignty which far from serving as a foundation for a mutually respectful social system to eliminate vulnerability, imposes vulnerability as a condition of participation while denying the choice of non-participation.**

**Crabapple 13:**

(Molly, July, “It don’t gitmo better than this: Inside the dark heart of G. Bay,” Vice online)

Every morning, the DoD emails the official tally of hunger strikers to the press. Out of the 166 men at Gitmo during my visit, 106 had joined the strike. Forty-five have lost enough weight to be, as the JTF calls it, “enterally fed,” which means there’s just enough flesh on their bones for them to survive. Nabil Hadjarab is one of them.

The hunger strike kicked off in February to protest guards’ alleged mishandling of Qur’ans, but that was just the catalyst. Bob Gensburg, a lawyer for detainee Abdul Zahir, told me, “The hunger strike is the culmination of 12 years of abuse, the end to which none of them can see. They believe they will be there forever, helpless, humiliated, stripped of their humanity.” Carol Rosenberg, who has been covering Gitmo for the last 12 years, wrote in a report for the *Miami Herald* that when detainees covered surveillance cameras in their communal cellblock, guards stormed in with rubber bullets and locked detainees in single cells. With this act, the “golden age” of Gitmo was over.

**Nabil [Hadjarab]** loves soccer**—**his favorite player is Lionel Messi. He used to practice classical Arabic calligraphy. He also used to work out and became fluent in English, with dreams of becoming a translator. He **kept his mind on a future beyond Gitmo, but as the years passed since he was cleared for release, that future became a mirage.**

On March 18 of this year, the Army announced it had begun force-feeding hunger strikers. **Twice a day, guards tie Nabil to a chair and push his head back. Doctors shove a length of surgical tubing through his nose, down his throat, and into his stomach. Then they pump a can of Ensure through the tube. Nabil is masked** (“spitting is a tactic [used by detainees],” according to Gitmo spokesman Captain Robert Durand), **and left tied to the chair until he has digested the Ensure.**

“We will not allow the detainees to harm themselves, whether by hoarding pills, making weapons, or starving,” Lt. Col. Breasseale told me. He also said that some detainees don’t even need to be tied down, but would rather lie back and accept the feeding tube. Detainees even get to choose their flavor of Ensure.

**Force-feeding**, while practiced in some American prisons, **is condemned by the American Medical Association. It is intensely painful**, and can cause pneumonia if liquid drips into the victim’s lungs.

Force-fed detainee Samir Naji al Hasan Moqbel described the experience in an editorial for the *New York Times.* “As [the tube] was thrust in, it made me feel like throwing up. . .There was agony in my chest, throat, and stomach. I had never experienced such pain before.” **When I brought this up to Lt. Col. Breasseale, he responded, “They’re detainees. They’ve had their liberty removed. No one likes that. But that in itself is not torture.”**

It is Captain Durand’s view that what detainees are really starving for is attention. “They’re seeing their lawyers on television and seeing media attention from it,” he said. “That encourages more people to join.” He added “I think it’s interesting that the Taliban were the first to report about [the hunger strike].”

Throughout our trip, press officers told me and the other reporters present that no one suffers negative repercussions for going on hunger strike, but Captain Durand said that detainees won’t go back to communal living until they eat on their own. So Nabil sits alone in his cell, his family letters and drawings confiscated, with only his Qur’an for company. If he wants to speak to his lawyer, guards search his genitals before and after he uses the phone.

“*Solitary confinement* is a very emotionally charged phrase,” Captain Durand continued. “But, single-celled detention is not solitary confinement. They can still talk to one another. Their cell ports are open.”

**During his last phone call, Nabil told [his lawyer]** Cori [Crider]: **“I am desperate for freedom. In our brief lives, freedom is all that matters.** Things like privileges and food are secondary and meaningless. **Force-feeding us is a way of burying what we have to say. In this place, isn’t the last thing I have left the ability to decide what to do with my own life?** Will the military be allowed to take this from me too?”

**Robinson 11:**

(Andrew, January 7, “In theory - Giorgio Agamben: The state and the concentration camp,” Ceasefire online)

Agamben’s theory of the state is constructed as an ontological theory of sovereignty. ‘Ontology’ is the philosophical study of the nature of being, reality and existence as such, and Agamben (along with Deleuze and Badiou) is controversial in reviving it following its widespread rejection as a justification for conformity by earlier poststructuralist authors. The problem of sovereignty is ontological because it relates closely to the question of life, and also because it is central to what the state is; it is not contingent on specific aspects of state discourse. Since the problem of sovereignty, and the corresponding problem of the camp, are ontological, the solutions also have to be ontological: a rejection of the state’s way of being, and the establishment of a completely different way of being (the possibility and conditions for which also need to be deduced from ontology, and especially, from the nature of life).

**Agamben’s account treats sovereignty as a primary or original aspect of social life, not a secondary or derivative aspect.** Agamben rejects the Marxist view of the state as superstructure, and does not see power as mystified. Rather, **state sovereignty operates directly on life, reshaping it according to the state’s perspective or way of seeing.** According to Agamben, sovereignty provides a basic matrix from which all the different kinds of state sovereignty can be derived. Agamben’s discussions thus wander between ancient states such as the Roman Empire, histories of monarchic and democratic regimes, and observations on current events. Agamben seeks to show both that sovereignty (in his special sense of the term) exists in all states through time, and that it is a cumulative process, something which in a sense is getting worse. The existence of sovereignty is something which Agamben seeks to demonstrate in his writings. It can be understood through the history of forms of sovereignty and of legal concepts, and also through critically interpreting authoritarian pro-state theorists such as Thomas Hobbes and Carl Schmitt. Agamben is thus arguing that the nature of state sovereignty can be deduced from the way that statists think, which in turn can be inferred from their writings. In this sense, despite his return to ontology, Agamben is not a world away from poststructuralists and other discourse analysts.

**Agamben defines sovereignty mainly in terms of exclusion or exception. Sovereignty is constitutive of the state and of statist politics, because it constitutes the political body by deciding who is to be incorporated into it. This decision is grounded on a fundamental exclusion of what is to remain outside. Sovereignty is more basic to the state than law, because it is the sovereign who decides where and whether law applies. In Benjamin’s terms, sovereignty employs ‘law-creating violence’ which underpins the later enforcement of laws. This kind of approach puts Agamben a long way from the idea that politics involves people forming some kind of mutually respectful social system to eliminate vulnerability. For Agamben, politics is instead grounded on rendering people vulnerable and abject, on subjection to a power so total that it can command life and death. The state is authoritarian command and submission to such command; it is not mutual recognition, equality, or reciprocity. It imposes vulnerability as a condition of participation in public or political life. An example of this is the way states seek to legislate visibility and vulnerability, banning protesters from wearing masks, wearing body armour and so on – in effect, commanding people to be vulnerable to persecution.**